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THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT COMPLIANCE JOB: 
DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE 
Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto* 
Universities have an absolute obligation as NCAA members to 
maintain control of their athletic programs.  These programs are highly 
visible, highly scrutinized, and highly criticized when something goes 
wrong.  Institutional compliance directors investigate and report NCAA 
violations.  They also oversee incidents involving student-athlete behav-
ioral issues, and they are the athletic department liaisons to the greater 
campus.  Scrutiny and criticism of athletic programs necessarily extends 
to scrutiny of their work. 
This article describes the nuts and bolts of the institutional compli-
ance job.  It then focuses on a prime impediment to effective compliance 
risk management—the failure of those with information about violations 
to report that information to the compliance director.  Finally, it offers 
guidance on how to increase the likelihood of reports being made.  It 
also sets forth the minimal requisites of a violation investigation, and the 
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The National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) is a mem-
ber-driven private association of four-year post-high-school educational 
institutions1 that administers championships and regulates intercolle-
giate athletics competition.2  Its bylaws cover rules of the game, team 
 
 1. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 4, § 
4.02.1 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. 
 2. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.2. 
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staffing limits, and coach and student-athlete deportment.3  Because con-
duct by and concerning student-athletes off the field can impact compe-
tition on the field, NCAA bylaws also cover student-athlete academic 
performance and integrity and the off-field conduct of athletes, staff, and 
boosters.4 
NCAA bylaws and policies operate directly only on NCAA mem-
ber institutions.5  An obvious requirement of membership is that member 
institutions must comply with the NCAA Constitution, bylaws, and pol-
icies.6  Another requirement of NCAA membership is the cooperative 
principle.  Pursuant to the cooperative principle, NCAA member institu-
tions must cooperate in uncovering, investigating, and reporting viola-
tions.7 
Universities act only through the people for whom they are respon-
sible.  That means universities meet their obligations of rules compliance 
and investigative cooperation by enforcing those obligations on their 
coaches, other staff members, and student-athletes.8  Coaches, staff 
members, and student-athletes annually certify to their rules compliance 
and acknowledge their obligation to report violations.9 
 
 3. E.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 17, Art. 18. 
 4. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 16 (prohibiting payments and other benefits 
provided to student-athletes); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 14 (governing academic 
eligibility to compete); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 13 (governing conduct with 
recruits, including inducements); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 15 (governing finan-
cial aid). Boosters include individuals who make donations to get season tickets, make finan-
cial contributions to athletic departments, or help to promote university athletics. See NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, § 6.4.2 (Representatives of Athletics Interests). Role of Boosters, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/role-boosters (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 5. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 1.3.2, 2.1.2, 2.8 
 6. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 2.8, 19.2.1. See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 
1 (The Commitment to Institutional Control and Compliance). 
 7. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 19.2.3, 19.01.3. 
 8. The focus of this article is on how compliance directors achieve effective monitoring 
and processing of violations to assure a rules compliant institutional environment. Outside the 
scope of this article, because it is outside the job responsibility of compliance directors, is a 
critically important component to achieving rules compliance—the establishment by high-
level university and athletic administrators of a positive environment for staff and student-
athletes, one that reinforces and provides incentives for acting in ethical, rules-abiding ways. 
Also critically important, and outside the scope of this article is the hiring and student-athlete 
reinstatement process. The best assurance of rules compliance is a work force and student-
athletes who embody ethical behavior. 
 9. Coaches and staff annually execute a Certification of Compliance by which they cer-
tify that they have no knowledge of any violations. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 
3.2.4.16, 18.4.2.1.1. The obligation to be rules compliant also is included in coach contracts. 
Student-athletes annually execute a Student-Athlete Statement. See infra note 33. Staff mem-
bers and student-athletes commit unethical conduct by refusing to “furnish information rele-
vant to an investigation of a possible violation of an NCAA regulation when requested to do 
so” and by “[k]nowingly furnishing . . . false or misleading information concerning . . . in-
volvement in or knowledge of matters relevant to a possible violation of an NCAA regula-
tion.” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 10.1(a), (c). 
 
90 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE JOB: IN GENERAL 
Institutional compliance directors perform the central risk manage-
ment prevention functions of rules education and monitoring bylaw 
compliance to prevent violations.10  They handle rules interpretation11 
and the process of seeking waivers from the operation of bylaws.12  They 
are the athletic department’s point person for investigating potential by-
law violations and reporting to the NCAA enforcement staff when vio-
lations are committed.13  To do all these jobs properly, institutional com-
pliance directors must be knowledgeable about NCAA bylaws and 
policies, as well as bylaw interpretations and amplifying educational ma-
terial that give scope and content to the black letter of a bylaw. 
In most ways, the work of institutional compliance directors sup-
ports and facilitates the objectives of staff and student-athletes.  Both 
rules education and rules interpretation assist coaches and staff to fore-
stall the commission of violations.  Waivers, when successful, permit 
student-athletes and staff to engage in conduct that otherwise would con-
stitute a violation.  Interpretative efforts also often result in finding a 
rules-compliant way for coaches and staff to achieve their objectives.14 
Compliance directors necessarily are a Janus,15 however, with the 
educational/interpretative face being friendly and supportive and the 
monitoring/investigative face being skeptical and potentially adversar-
ial.  To be successful in effective oversight, compliance directors must 
forge positive working relationships with coaches and other staff and 
establish and maintain informal channels of communication grounded in 
 
 10. See ROBERT R. MOELLER, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 58-60, 68-70, 
210 (2d ed. 2011). It also is a byproduct of new laws; new technology; changes in the econ-
omy; and evolving social mores, interactions, and priorities. Id. at 67-68. Reputational risk is 
triggered by both external and internal events. See id. at 210. 
 11. For an overview of the NCAA interpretations process, see NCAA MANUAL, supra 
note 1, §§ 5.4.1, 5.4.1.2. 
 12. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.02.16. When there is no committee with 
subject matter authority over a waiver, waivers are handled by the Committee for Legislative 
Relief. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.1.3. 
 13. The NCAA enforcement staff investigates bylaw violations and the COI adjudicates 
them. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 19. The compliance director also is the liai-
son between the university and the NCAA enforcement staff when a Level I or Level II vio-
lation is processed. See E-mail from Jamie Vaughn, Exec. Assoc. Athletic Dir. for Compli-
ance, Univ. of Neb. Athletics, to Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics 
Representative, Univ. of Neb. (Mar. 7, 2020, 1:12 PM) (on file with author). See infra note 
20 for a discussion of the hierarchy of NCAA violations. The email from Vaughn also demon-
strates that the FAR has oversight of this process. Email, Jamie Vaughn, supra. 
 14. For information on the NCAA process, see INTERPRETATION REQUEST FORM FOR 
NCAA DIVISION I INTERPRETATIONS COMMITTEE, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/Interpretation%20Request%20Form%2042715.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
 15. Janus, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Janus-Ro-
man-god (last visited Aug. 14, 2020). 
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an atmosphere of trust.  At the same time, monitoring involves double 
checking and verifying information; at least some staff perceive these 
monitoring efforts as compliance staff mistrust of them.  The potential 
for conflict between compliance directors and those monitored, moreo-
ver, can become a real conflict even with requests for bylaw interpreta-
tions.  On occasion, coaches or others attempt to pressure or wheedle 
compliance directors to provide a convenient interpretation or to resolve 
an inquiry more quickly and on less evidence than they think is war-
ranted.16 
A full-blown investigation of a coach or other staff member for 
complicity in the commission of serious NCAA violations, characterized 
as Level I or Level II, can be explicitly adversarial, even confrontational, 
as an investigation can end with negative job consequences for coaches 
and other athletic staff and NCAA penalties for them, student-athletes, 
particular athletic teams, and for the athletic department.17 
Individuals who are penalized may be popular within the athletic 
department. Scholarship limits and other team penalties may lead to los-
ing seasons.  Athletic department staff, and those outside the athletics 
department, may blame a compliance director for producing these im-
pacts.18  They also may view the compliance director as disloyal to co-
workers and unconcerned about the impacts that are caused. 
The obvious relational impact will be between compliance staff and 
those investigated.  But the post-investigative aftermath also may have a 
negative impact on the relationship between the compliance staff and 
 
 16. See Jeff Eisenberg, Toughest jobs in sports: NCAA enforcement staff member, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (July 27, 2014, 9:38 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/ncaab-the-dag-
ger/toughest-jobs-in-sports—ncaa-enforcement-staff-member-163826437.html; see gener-
ally ENFORCEMENT SELF-STUDY: OPERATIONS AND COMPLIANCE, 
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/EWG%20self-study_052616(final).pdf (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2020). 
 17. There are four classifications of NCAA violations. Level I violations are the most 
serious. They provide or are intended to provide a substantial recruiting or competitive ad-
vantage or substantial impermissible benefits. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.1.1. Ex-
amples are academic fraud and cash payments to a recruit that result in the recruit’s enrollment 
at an institution. Level II violations provide more than a minimal but less than a substantial 
recruiting or competitive advantage or impermissible benefit. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, 
§ 19.1.2. Level IV violations are technical violations. An example is the failure to have all 
required documents (SAT score, high school transcript, etc.) filed before a prospect takes an 
official visit, when all the documents substantively are sufficient and ultimately were filed. 
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 13.6.3. Level IV violations are handled by Conference 
offices. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 19.11.2, 19.12.2. For a description of Level III 
violations, see infra note 47. 
 18. See, e.g., Sam Blum, ‘They gotta point the finger at somebody’: Ex-Stephen F. Austin 
compliance leader says he’s not to blame for NCAA issues, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 20, 
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those not the target of an investigation.19  Rebuilding the harmonious 
relationship needed for the compliance part of the compliance job may 
be difficult. Some relationships may be irrevocably broken. 
Having a fully engaged individual outside athletics with oversight 
of compliance is an important way to ameliorate both the real time and 
downstream consequences that aspects of the compliance job, and par-
ticularly investigations, can have on the relationship between compli-
ance staff and others in the athletic department.  That person can take 
responsibility for unpopular investigative decisions.  To be most helpful, 
that person needs to have a close understanding of NCAA bylaws and 
NCAA national office operations and also must know and be known by 
athletic department coaches and other staff.  That person should have 
regular communication with the compliance staff and sufficient time to 
do oversight effectively.  Engaging with athletics only when Level I or 
Level II violations are uncovered is problematic; effective oversight is 
not achieved post hoc. 
At the University of Nebraska, the outside person is the faculty ath-
letic representative  (FAR),20 a position required by the NCAA Consti-
tution.21  The compliance director promptly reports to the FAR all 
 
 19. Their myriad roles can be stressful to manage, and, when in a monitoring or investi-
gative mode, compliance staff can feel isolated. Architecture has an impact. Compliance staff 
should be located in the heart of athletics activities, ideally near the training table and aca-
demic support. In addition, academic staff, including tutors, should be housed together. They 
should not be housed with the athletic team with which they work. Loyalties may be mis-
placed. The opportunity for cross-pollination and support is reduced. 
 20. The Nebraska FAR description: The Nebraska FAR is charged by the chancellor to 
provide active and close oversight of athletics. She has dotted line oversight of compliance 
and solid line oversight of athletics academic services which, at Nebraska, includes academic 
standards and integrity, and admissions and eligibility matters. She is the liaison between the 
chancellor and the compliance and athletics academic services staffs. She signs off on, and on 
occasion writes, Nebraska self-reports of violations to the Conference and to the NCAA, re-
quests for waivers of the application of a Conference rule or NCAA bylaw, and formal re-
quests for bylaw interpretation. She is informed at a preliminary stage of all matters that might 
be a major violation, those that affect a high-profile sport or athlete, and others that are iden-
tified as raising sensitive issues. She participates in decisions as to the direction and scope of 
investigations and, at her discretion, decides the extent of her active involvement, including 
whether to participate in interviews. She is the point person on legislative proposals. She 
chairs the UNL Chancellor’s Intercollegiate Athletics Review Committee (other members are 
the University General Counsel and the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs), which, if 
needed, would handle exclusively external (to athletics) the investigation and processing of 
an NCAA major infractions case or other major athletics issue. See Harvey Perlman, Estab-
lishment of the Intercollegiate Athletics Review Comm., UNIV. NEBRASKA-LINCOLN (July 11, 
2004), https://www.unl.edu/chancellor/establishment-intercollegiate-athletics-review-com-
mittee [hereinafter Memorandum from UNL Chancellor]. 
 21. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 4.02, 6.1.3. There is good reason for a FAR to be 
the individual with outside oversight of athletics. The FAR typically is a tenured member of 
the faculty. Part of a faculty member’s job is to test hypotheses and be skeptical. Faculty 
interact with students, understand how they operate and also have informal lines of 
 
2020] THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT COMPLIANCE JOB 93 
potential violations, student-athlete well-being and behavioral issues, 
and projected waiver requests.22  The compliance director and the FAR 
consult regarding what action should be taken.  When interviews of staff 
or student-athletes are warranted, the compliance director and FAR typ-
ically conduct them together.23 
In sum, then, an effective compliance system requires not only an 
informed and experienced compliance director, but also engaged outside 
oversight.  Effective oversight for an athletics department, moreover, 
cannot stop with oversight of potential NCAA violations.  The outside 
person also must oversee, or at least be informed of, all matters that touch 
on student-athlete behavioral and wellbeing issues. 
Issues involving student-athletes or coaches may overlap several 
substantive areas (NCAA violations, Title IX misconduct, criminal con-
duct, coach misbehavior, student-athlete well-being, campus discipline 
or risk assessment, etc.).  A question regarding a coach’s interactions 
with student-athletes on a team may implicate NCAA violations but also 
institutional human resources policies.  Unless there is one central place, 
one responsible party in receipt of all information, no matter the subject 
area, a larger, perhaps more ominous, picture may be obscured.  It is 
lethal for effective oversight if different people have parts of a story, but 
no one has the full story. 
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE JOB: COMPONENTS 
The institutional compliance job has many components.  Part III 
lists the major components of the job, and then describes the prime ways 
that compliance directors go about doing them. 
A. Compliance Forms 
Much of the day-to-day compliance function revolves around re-
viewing forms created to help monitor compliance with NCAA 
 
communication with them. Faculty are familiar with campus processes. Faculty are less trou-
bled by hierarchical structures and more willing to challenge authority. Tenured faculty have 
job security. A FAR adds to that set of characteristics the fact that she is familiar with NCAA 
bylaws and processes, and knows people in the athletic department, the Conference Office, 
and the NCAA national office. She already is the eyes and ears of the campus president. 
 22. Memorandum from UNL Chancellor, supra note 20. The FAR also is informed of 
student-athlete Title IX and criminal conduct as well as HR issues involving coaches and other 
staff. See generally NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
PERSPECTIVES OF NCAA FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES 35 (2013), 
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/FAR_STUDY_Report_final.pdf. 
 23. If the FAR believes that an investigation should be conducted outside athletics, the 
FAR can convene the Chancellor’s Intercollegiate Athletics Review Committee. See Memo-
randum from UNL Chancellor, supra note 20. 
 
94 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
bylaws.24  Coaches must report compliance with play/practice limits.25  
Student-athletes must complete the student-athlete statement26 and drug 
test permission forms.27  There are squad lists and eligibility certification 
forms to be completed.28  There is paperwork involving financial aid of-
fers, awards, renewals, and terminations.29  There are forms governing 
student-athlete outside competition,30 forms filed prior to prospective 
student-athlete official visits and forms filed subsequent to those visits.31  
Compliance staff manage forms related to student-athlete use of the 
transfer portal.32  They track complimentary football tickets33 and stu-
dent-athlete requests for, and payments from, the student-athlete assis-
tance fund.34 
Creating and reviewing forms is an important part of monitoring for 
rules compliance, but it is only part of that job.  People can make mis-
takes or lie on a form just as they can in an interview.35  Monitoring 
requires at least spot checking to assure the accuracy of information 
 
 24. See, e.g., 2020-21 Division I Compliance Forms, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/2019-
20-division-i-compliance-forms (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). There also are forms generated 
by institutional policy that compliance directors monitor in conjunction with the FAR and the 
Director of Athletic Academic Services. 
 25. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 17. Many athletic departments now use Team-
works or other software to monitor play/practice bylaw compliance and other student-athlete 
time demands. See E-mail from Jonathan Bateman, Assoc. Dir. of Compliance, Univ. of Neb. 
Athletics, to Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics Representative, Univ. 
of Neb. (Mar. 20, 2020, 10:21 AM) (on file with author); Elite Compliance Webinar, Front 
Rush (training on practice logs, declaring play/practice season, etc.) (on file with author). 
 26. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 3.2.4.6, 3.2.4.7, 12.7.2; NCAA Division 1 Student-
Athlete Statement Form 19-1a, NCAA, https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compli-
ance/d1/2019-20D1Comp_Form19-1a-StudentAthleteStatement.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 
2020). The student-athlete statement has six parts. Among other things, student-athletes attest 
that they have not violated NCAA rules, are eligible to compete, and are amateurs. Id. 
 27. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.5.11.3. 
 28. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 15.5.11. For a list of compliance forms required by 
the NCAA, see 2020-21 Division I Compliance Forms, supra note 24. 
 29. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 15.3.4, 15.3.5, 15.3.7. For an example of a form 
notifying a student-athlete of a financial aid termination, see E-mail and attachment from Lisa 
Dority, Athletic Scholarship Coordinator, Univ. of Neb., to Darien Chase, Student Athlete, 
Univ. of Neb. (Feb. 28, 2020, 4:32 PM) (on file with author). 
 30. See Outside Competition Form (on file with author). Outside competition refers to 
competitions in which student-athletes compete as individuals and not as members of a uni-
versity team. National and Olympic competition is outside competition. 
 31. The forms include an Official Visit Report (on file with author); Official Visit Guide-
lines (on file with author); Student Host Guidelines (on file with author); Official Visit Check-
list (on file with author). 
 32. See NCAA Overview of Four-Year College Transfer Data and NCAA Transfer Por-
tal Data (on file with author). 
 33. See Student-Athlete Complimentary Admission Request Form (on file with author). 
 34. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 16.11.1.8; 2019-20 Student-Athlete Assistance 
Fund Policies and Procedures (on file with author). 
 35. See, e.g., U. MICH., INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 333 at 6, (Nov. 4, 2010); U. IND., 
BLOOMINGTON, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 at 3 (Nov. 25, 2008). 
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recorded on a form.  Consider play/practice logs.  Compliance directors 
use these to monitor team compliance with NCAA limits on daily and 
weekly required athletic participation.  On occasion, and without prior 
notice, compliance staff should watch a practice or talk to student-ath-
letes or facilities staff about the length of time a team practiced.  These 
spot checks may surface violations not recorded on a form.  A coach who 
knows that these spot checks will occur likely will be more observant of 
play/practice rules and also exercise more care in completing the forms. 
B. Rules Education 
Compliance staff educate coaches, staff, student-athletes, and 
boosters on bylaws that affect them .36  Student-athletes typically receive 
in-person rules training at the beginning of each academic year, head 
coaches receive rules training at monthly compliance meetings,37 and 
other staff and boosters receive training as needed.  Rules education also 
includes information on new bylaw interpretations and information bear-
ing on bylaw scope and meaning that arises out of infractions or waiver 
cases.  Compliance staff also are responsible for tracking proposed by-
law additions and revisions and spearheading the institutional process 
for developing athletic department positions on them. 
C. Rules Interpretation 
Language is not self-defining. Even bylaw language that seems 
clear in the black letter may be opaque as to its application to particular 
situations.38  Contrary to most legal systems, where the body that adju-
dicates a violation of a rule also interprets the rule allegedly violated, the 
 
 36. See E-mail from Jonathan Bateman, Assoc. Dir. of Compliance, Univ. of Neb., to 
Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics Representative, Univ. of Neb. 
(Feb. 20, 2020, 11:19 AM) (on file with author). Rules education also is directed at those 
outside athletics with association with athletics. Id. These may include corporate sponsors, the 
university bookstore, and instructors with student-athletes in their classes. Id. Between June 
2018 and December 2019, the rules education for student-athletes at the University of Ne-
braska entailed three in-person meetings, eight compliance subjects summarized on TV mon-
itors in athletics, and ten emails on different compliance subjects. Id. Compliance information 
also is included in a student-athlete planner distributed to all student-athletes. Id. 
 37. See Agenda for Univ. of Neb. Head Coaches Meeting (Sept. 11, 2019, 12:00 PM) 
(on file with author). For an agenda of a monthly head coach meeting, see (602A) NCAA and 
Conference Regulations Review, KAN. ATHLETICS, https://kuathletics.com/602a-ncaa-and-
conference-regulations-review/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2020). 
 38. In consequence, all legal systems provide for controlling interpretations of existing 
language of a statute or rule when that language is challenged as insufficiently clear in appli-
cation. 
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NCAA interpretations process operates separately from the adjudicative 
process. 39 
Interpretations begin on campus, with questions directed at compli-
ance staff most often from coaches, but also from other staff, student-
athletes, and occasionally a booster.  They know what they want to do, 
but they may not know which facts will be critical to separating conduct 
that is rules-compliant from that which is rules-violative.  Their descrip-
tions of projected action may be imprecise or incomplete.  On occasion, 
moreover, they may attempt to direct a specific response by very care-
fully crafting the question that they ask. 
Compliance staff need to be sure that they have full information 
before answering a question.  They should always ask if there is action 
contemplated beyond what has been described.  They also must clearly 
state to the person who asked the question that their answer is specific to 
the facts provided and only to those facts.  The person who asked the 
question must understand that any deviation from those described facts 
triggers another consultation with compliance staff. 
Although each member of a compliance staff typically has clear 
subject areas of responsibility, the nature of compliance work means that 
these lines blur and also that, on occasion, another staff member must 
field a question because the compliance staff member with that specific 
responsibility is unavailable.  In consequence, compliance protocols 
should assure that all staff are made aware of questions asked and infor-
mation provided and that, before answering a question, a compliance 
staff member should ascertain whether another compliance member al-
ready answered it. 
Sometimes a head coach asks a question in the hope that the bylaw 
language does not mean what it plainly says.  At other times a head coach 
believes another university is interpreting the language differently, and 
this belief prompts an “interpretative” request.40  This type of question 
takes little time to answer, often requiring nothing more than a straight-
forward recitation of bylaw language. 
When bylaw language is unclear in its application to particular 
facts, compliance staff will confirm their reading of a bylaw’s scope and 
impact by checking NCAA interpretations posted on the NCAA 
 
 39. In part, that is because the NCAA system has an enforcement adjudicatory arm—the 
Committee on Infractions—but no equivalent interpretative adjudicatory arm. For a complete 
description of the NCAA interpretations process, see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.1; 
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at. fig. 5-1 (NCAA Division I Legislative Process); NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, at fig. 5-1 (Legislative Activity Calendar). 
 40. Interpretation Request Form for NCAA Division I Interpretation Committee, NCAA, 
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Interpretation%20Request%20Form%2042715.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
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legislative services database (LSDBi).41  On occasion, they consult with 
Conference or NCAA staff.42  Most often, the process ends with an 
NCAA staff response.43  In rare cases, compliance directors appeal a 
staff decision and seek a formal interpretative answer from the NCAA 
Interpretations Committee.44 
D. Waivers 
Institutional compliance staff seek waivers from the operation of a 
bylaw when they believe that conduct falls within the letter of a bylaw 
but not its intent.45  Waivers often involve a student-athlete’s eligibility 
to compete, where time is of the essence and coaches have high interest 
and want quick results.46  In consequence, handling a waiver request can 
be stressful. 
A compliance director’s first move in a waiver request is to direct 
a question to NCAA staff assigned to, and following guidelines set by, 
the NCAA committee with jurisdiction over the bylaw for which the 
waiver is sought. 47  Should a waiver be denied, institutional compliance 
 
 41. The LSDBi includes legislative proposals, infractions reports, interpretations, and 
waivers. See LSDBi Database, NCAA, https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/ (last visited Aug. 19, 
2020). A copy of the information summary, and a sample interpretations page, are on file in 
the office of Josephine R. Potuto. 
 42. See E-mail from Jamie Vaughn, Exec. Assoc. Athletic Dir. for Compliance, Univ. of 
Neb. Athletics, to Athletics Head Coaches & Assistant Coaches, Univ. of Neb. Athletics (Oct. 
14, 2019, 4:44 PM) (on file with author). A prime responsibility of the NCAA Membership 
Affairs staff is to interpret bylaws. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.1.2.1. For an illus-
tration of the NCAA model of analysis, see generally NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, 
INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265 (2007) (West Virginia University); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON 
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 163 11-12 (1999) (University of Notre Dame). 
Compliance staff also may seek guidance from compliance administrators at the Conference 
Office. 
 43. These interpretations are not published, and may be relied on only by the institution 
involved. When an interpretative request has broader implications and potentially more far-
reaching consequences, a decision is referred to the Interpretations Committee and ultimately 
published. All these decisions are reviewed by the Division I Legislation Committee. See 
NCAA DIV. 1 INTERPRETATIONS COMM., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (2019). 
 44. These answers typically resolve the appeal. They are reviewed by the Division I leg-
islative committee. If approved, they then are published on the NCAA website. See NCAA 
DIV. 1 INTERPRETATIONS COMM., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (2019). 
 45. See Waivers, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/content-categories/eligibility/waivers 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
 46. See, e.g., Remaining Eligible: Academic Waivers, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/re-
maining-eligible-academic-waivers (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). 
 47. Committees with responsibility for particular bylaws consider waivers specific to the 
bylaws for which they have responsibility. Such bylaw responsibility includes waivers of team 
CAP rules, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 23.1, validation of academic records of prospec-
tive student-athletes, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 14.1.2.1, 14.1.2.2, and initial and 
continuing eligibility of individual student-athletes, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 
14.3.1.5, 14.4.3.6. Although the NCAA provides no general set of policies and procedures 
governing all committees, each committee has published policies and procedures governing 
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staff may appeal the decision to the applicable committee.48  The waiver 
and appeal process are handled online.49 
E. NCAA Violations 
Institutional staff members, boosters, and student-athletes can com-
mit NCAA violations.50  Each of their violations also is an institutional 
violation.51  If the Committee on Infractions (COI)52 concludes that in-
stitutional monitoring and oversight were not reasonably calculated to 
prevent and uncover violations, then it will penalize the institution for a 
failure to monitor its athletic programs53 or for a more general lack of 
institutional control.54 
Institutional and staff culpability for violations is resolved through 
the infractions process; Level I and Level II violations typically result in 
in-person, adversarial hearings before the COI.55  Institutional 
 
its operations. See, e.g., Student-Athlete Reinstatement, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/compli-
ance/reinstatement/student-athlete-reinstatement (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 48. See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.8.4.1.1. 
 49. Example of Filed Waiver (on file with author). 
 50. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.8.1. 
 51. Institutional responsibility tracks the law of respondeat superior in which employers 
are liable for intentional torts of employees that arise out of the employment relationship when 
the employee acts, or intends to act, in furtherance of the employer’s interests. CLARK 
BOARDMAN CALLAGHAN, 54 CAUSES OF ACTION 255 § 2 (2d ed. 2020). To some degree, 
institutional responsibility in NCAA processes also tracks agency principles that make it un-
fair for an enterprise to benefit from the work of its agents and yet not be responsible when 
they cause harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1958). Under general agency law, principals are not responsible when their agents act solely 
in their own self-interest. Id. § 23. By virtue of the institutional control mandate, NCAA in-
stitutions are responsible for the conduct of staff and others beyond what agency principles 
dictate. At the same time, NCAA coach and staff misconduct is typically directed at team 
success. That success inures to the benefit of the athletic department even when it also injures 
the department because of violation of NCAA bylaws. 
 52. The COI adjudicates institutional and staff violations. See infra note 54 and accom-
panying text for the jurisdiction of the COI and how it works. 
 53. See, e.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 262, 
15-18 (2006) (University of Kansas); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS 
REPORT NO. 191, 12-13 (2001) (Marshall University); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON 
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 (2016) (University of Notre Dame). 
 54. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.8.1. See, e.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON 
INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 192, 20-24 (2002) (University of Kentucky). 
 55. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.7.7. The COI makes factual findings and writes 
full infractions reports explaining the reasons for its findings and penalties. NCAA MANUAL, 
supra note 1, § 19.8.1. Ancillary to its responsibility to resolve cases, the COI oversees sched-
uling of cases before it and resolves procedural issues, including those directed at the conduct 
of enforcement staff. Procedural matters must be raised prior to or during an infractions hear-
ing or else they are waived. They are resolved at the hearing, see, e.g., INFRACTIONS REPORT 
NO. 265, supra note 42, at 37-43, or in a separate hearing preceding the hearing on the merits, 
see, e.g., NCAA D1 COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 256 (March 10, 
2006) (Ohio State University). Two other COI responsibilities are to determine whether cases 
offered for processing through summary disposition may be so resolved or require a full 
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culpability for less serious violations, characterized as Level III,56 is han-
dled by the NCAA enforcement staff based on the investigation and self-
report of institutional compliance staff; the enforcement staff conduct no 
independent investigation.57  Student-athlete culpability for all violations 
is resolved through the student-athlete reinstatement process, which mir-
rors the process for handling institutional culpability for Level III viola-
tions.58  The responsibility of the Reinstatement Committee and staff is 
limited to assessing a student-athlete’s responsibility based on infor-
mation that the institutional compliance director provides and then de-
ciding the conditions to be imposed before a student-athlete will be re-
instated to competition eligibility.59 
F. The Compliance Job Beyond NCAA Bylaws 
Compliance staff monitor institutional athletic policies60 as well as 
those of the athletic conference to which a member institution belongs.  
When student-athletes or athletic staff are the focus, the head compliance 
director also may have monitoring responsibility even though the poli-
cies enforced are not those of the NCAA, conference, or institutional 
athletic department.  Some aspects of student-athlete well-being are cov-
ered by NCAA bylaws,61 but many others are not.  On occasion, and 
particularly when the issue is coach treatment of student-athletes, there 
may be an overlap with institutional human resources policies.  Institu-
tional compliance staff sometimes also participate in these inquiries. 
 
hearing, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 32.7, and to appear before the IAC to respond to 
appeals. This latter function is handled by the two COI coordinators of appeals. NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.1.1.4. 
 56. Level III violations are isolated and inadvertent and produce only limited competitive 
advantage. For these, no independent NCAA investigation takes place. Instead, NCAA staff 
rely on the investigation and fact findings of  institutional compliance staff. NCAA MANUAL, 
supra note 1, § 19.1.4. 
 57. For a general description of handling Level III violations, see NCAA MANUAL, su-
pra note 1, § 19.12. 
 58. For a full discussion of the NCAA reinstatement process, see Josephine R. Potuto, 
The NCAA Student-Athlete Reinstatement Process: Say What?, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 297 (2015). 
Student-athlete violations render a student-athlete ineligible until reinstated through the 
NCAA student-athlete reinstatement process. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 14.11.1, 
14.11.2, 14.12. 
 59. For reinstatement purposes, consequences to student-athletes are not called “penal-
ties.” Instead, they are called “reinstatement conditions.” See supra note 56 and accompanying 
text. 
 60. At Nebraska, for example, the athletic academic services staff, compliance staff, and 
the FAR track instructors with a relationship with athletics who have student-athletes in their 
classes. See E-mail from Leah Huber, Administrative Assistant to Athletic Dir., Univ. of Neb. 
Athletics, to Josephine R. Potuto, Professor of Law & Faculty Athletics Representative, Univ. 
of Neb. (Mar. 3, 2020) (on file with author). 
 61. Bylaws that limit the hours a student-athlete may play or practice are an example. 
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Art. 17. 
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The head compliance director also may be the staff member in the 
athletic department who interacts with the campus Title IX administra-
tor, campus threat assessment team, campus police, campus student dis-
cipline and academic misconduct offices, and city police.  In these cases, 
the compliance director does not investigate but acts as liaison, facilitates 
information acquisition and scheduling, and also evaluates whether the 
conduct may violate NCAA bylaws and, therefore, ultimately require a 
compliance investigation.62  The laws and policies that may apply to stu-
dent-athlete conduct or that of athletic department staff include not only 
Title IX,63 but also the Clery Act,64 federal criminal statutes, state crim-
inal statutes, county and city ordinances, and university/regents/trustees 
policies. 
G. Compliance Directors as Athletic Department Senior Staff 
Compliance directors are part of the athletic department’s senior 
executive staff.  Senior executive staff members typically are assigned 
athletic teams to supervise.  Sports supervisors oversee head coaches and 
also manage team budget requests, team travel, and day-to-day team or-
ganizational and operational matters that may arise.  Sports supervision 
adds time demands to an already time-intensive compliance job, and it 
further complicates the conflict between a compliance director’s coop-
erative and investigative roles.65  This conflict is particularly acute when 
a compliance director, acting as sports supervisor, has factual infor-
mation regarding an investigation or was part of a decision-making pro-
cess relevant to an investigation. 
In a world focused only on compliance and investigative impera-
tives, compliance directors would not supervise sports.  Sports supervi-
sion, however, fully integrates a compliance director into an athletic di-
rector’s management team, an important goal for an athletic director.  In 
addition, sports supervision is an important box to check for a compli-
ance director who seeks to move from compliance to general athletic 
administration. 
 
 62. See Jake New, The ‘Black Hole’ of College Sports, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/02/09/baylor-not-alone-shielding-athletes-ac-
cused-misconduct-punishment. 
 63. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1972). 
 64. The Clery Act requires universities to maintain crime statistics and report them to 
students and staff. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f). 
 65. For an example of how the pressure of the two roles may affect the compliance re-
sponsibility, see INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 at 3-4 (2008) (Indiana University, Blooming-
ton). 
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If a compliance director supervises sports, there needs to be a writ-
ten policy on file that describes the protocols that apply to minimize con-
flicts and the process to be employed when a conflict arises.66  Among 
other things, the policy should specify that compliance directors will not 
supervise large squad teams or high profile sports.  Large squads entail 
time and work that compliance directors can ill afford to devote.  High 
profile sports are likely to trigger more instances in which investigations 
may be needed and also enhanced public scrutiny of those  investiga-
tions.67  In consequence, the responsibility for these investigations must 
be in the hands of the compliance director. 
IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO RISK MANAGEMENT 
No system can avoid all risk because that requires both perfect 
knowledge and perfect execution, each unattainable by fallible human 
beings over the long haul.  Even if perfection were attainable, it comes 
at too great a cost.  Avoiding major NCAA violations is a substantial 
interest of a university and its athletics department, but it is not the only 
one.  The cost of a full-bore monitoring system will be expensive; the 
tradeoff may be cessation of, or limits on, athletic programs or staffing.  
A full-bore monitoring system also will be overblown compared to the 
type and incidence of most violations that will be committed.68  Costs 
aside, no one wants to live or work in a police state, with a compliance 
officer watching every move.  “Big brother is watching you”69 does not 
portend a positive work environment.  The NCAA requisites of institu-
tional control mean that a university has systems in place reasonably cal-
culated to detect and report violations, not a system that is calculated to 
 
 66. The protocols should specify, for example, that someone in the compliance depart-
ment other than the compliance director will manage compliance issues for a team the com-
pliance director supervises. The protocols should specify, as another example, that someone 
in the compliance department other than the compliance director will be involved if there is 
an investigation of team members or staff. 
 67. See, e.g., Dan Kane, NCAA faces criticism for UNC decision, NEWS&OBSERVER 
(Oct. 14, 2017, 9:11 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/unc/arti-
cle178784981.html. 
 68. There are several systems used to evaluate the type, potential, and likelihood that 
violations and misconduct might occur, as well as the potential harm to individuals and the 
enterprise. MOELLER, supra note 10, at 43-49. These include brainstorming, use of a group of 
experts to ponder potential risks identified to them (called the “oracle” method), a variation 
of the oracle method (called the “Delphi” method) in which there is a loop interaction between 
the oracles, use of computer models and simulations (called the “Monte Carlo” method), and 
finally assessment of risk as interrelated probabilities with the occurrence of one risk making 
more likely (or more serious) the occurrence of other risk (called the “decision tree” method). 
Id. at 45-49. 
 69. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, 3 (1983). 
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cover every contingency that might happen, no matter the cost to other 
important and worthwhile institutional goals and interests.70 
A. Failure to Report Suspected Misconduct 
A prime component in a system reasonably calculated to detect vi-
olations is that individuals with information about violations report what 
they know.  Yet time and again, individuals fail to report misconduct. 
From childhood, people are told not to tattle tale.  Athletic staff fear 
career impact when what they report implicates a valued employee such 
as the head coach of the football team or when it may cause trouble to 
an athletic team or program.71  They worry that they will not be be-
lieved,72 and they worry about job consequences.73  They likely second-
guess themselves.74  They also may think, wrongly, that they have no 
responsibility to report because a supervisor also heard the information 
or because the information came from someone in another athletic unit.  
Their reluctance to report may be amplified by a concern that their report 
may cause unwarranted damage to reputation or job prospects because 
decision-makers will overreact rather than provide a measured response 
to available information.75 
 
 70. See Principles of Institutional Control as Prepared by the NCAA Committee on In-
fraction (on file with author); see also Draft of Standards for Effective Compliance and Risk 
Management Programs Maintaining Institutional Control, D-IA Athletics Directors Associa-
tion Compliance and Enforcement Task Force (June 5, 2013) (on file with author). 
 71. It is a prime reason that graduate students and untenured faculty members remain 
silent about abuse perpetrated by faculty. Kate Clancy, From the Field: Hazed Tells Her Story 
of Harassment, SCI. AM. (Jan. 30, 2012), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/context-and-
variation/from-the-field-hazed-tells-her-story-of-harassment/; Tom Bartlett & Nell Gluck-
man, More Women Come Forward to Report Sexual Harassment by Harvard Professor, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/More-Women-
Come-Forward-to/242737. Concern over career consequences also deterred most of Harvey 
Weinstein’s accusers from reporting his misconduct when it occurred. Jodi Kantor & Megan 
Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-alle-
gations.html. 
 72. See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 71. 
 73. The fear that there will be job consequences is not unfounded. See, e.g., Richard 
Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 977 (2008); 
Detlev Nitsch et al., Why Code of Conduct Violations Go Unreported: A Conceptual Frame-
work to Guide Intervention and Future Research, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 327, 335 (2005). 
 74. One of Larry Nasser’s victims said, “I’d make excuses” in an attempt to reconcile 
conduct she knew was wrong. Dan Barry, Serge F. Kovaleski, & Juliet Macur, As F.B.I. Took 
a Year to Pursue the Nassar Case, Dozens Say They Were Molested, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/sports/nassar-fbi.html. For a discussion of Larry 
Nassar and the sex abuse scandal at Michigan State University, see infra note 90 and accom-
panying text. 
 75. Many believe that this describes the treatment of its men’s lacrosse team and student-
athletes by the Duke athletic and campus administration. See, e.g., DON YAEGER & MIKE 
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Other impediments to reporting are that those with information be-
lieve that there is little likelihood that the violations will recur, that the 
violations are only Level III and do not warrant the inconvenience of 
reporting, or that no report is needed because the violation has been  rem-
edied as, for example, by a coach directing a student-athlete to return 
money given to the student-athlete by a booster. 
All these reasons combine to produce perhaps the biggest, and most 
intractable, impediment to reporting—an individual’s belief that a report 
should be made only when an individual is certain, or nearly so, that a 
violation has occurred.  This conflates the initial stage of an investigation 
with a post-investigation finding of culpability, a fundamental misunder-
standing of what reporting signifies. 
Individuals who seek certainty before reporting ignore the possibil-
ity that others also may have information relevant to a misconduct cal-
culus.  When each holder of a single piece of information fails to report, 
then there is real risk that major violations will go undetected.  A uni-
versity is the sum total of students and staff, and it is held to know the 
information of each, both individually and collectively.  It gets no hall 
pass from a finding of failure of institutional control, and associated pen-
alties,76 because information was dispersed across staff members and 
students rather than centralized in the hands of one person. 
When a suspected violation goes unreported, the fact that someone 
earlier knew something likely will sit in memory, or in a text or email, 
ready later to be uncovered.  A subsequent investigation, when it finally 
comes, not only will amp up findings and penalties for information not 
earlier shared, but the failure to report also removes a salient opportunity 
for an institution to evaluate, and reform, institutional compliance and 
oversight systems.77  These lost opportunities can have a cascading 
 
PRESSLER, IT’S NOT ABOUT THE TRUTH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE 
AND THE LIVES IT SHATTERED (2007). 
 76. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.9.3. 
 77. The need for effective board oversight was highlighted at least by the time of the 
financial crises in the mid-2000’s. E.g., Jim Deloach, 10 Principles for Effective Board Risk 
Oversight, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (June 5, 2017), http://www.corporatecompliancein-
sights.com/10-principles-for-effective-board-risk-oversight/. The issue of board oversight 
also is a focus area for university administrations. The Association of Governing Boards of 
Universities and Colleges (AGB), for example, has a wealth of publications and reports related 
to Board accountability and risk management. A list may be found on its web page. AGB, 
https://www.agb.org/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). It advocates ERM (effective risk manage-
ment). Among its recommendations: Make risk management a priority, discuss potential risks 
frequently, and assure that information is shared, especially “cross-functional” information; 
ASS’N of Governing Boards of U. and Colleges, A Wake-up Call: Enterprise Risk Manage-
ment at Colleges and Universities Today, AGB (2014), https://www.agb.org/sites/de-
fault/files/legacy/RiskSurvey2014.pdf. 
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effect, with each of them amplifying and magnifying the overall conse-
quences when the violations finally surface. 
B. Coach Involvement in Investigations 
Problems can occur even when someone reports a suspicion that 
violations were committed.  Perhaps the most prevalent problem is that 
reports are made to someone in the athletic department other than the 
compliance director.  When a potential violation involves a student-ath-
lete, or the information relates to a particular team, then the invariable 
reaction is to report the matter to the head coach.78  Even if the head 
coach takes no action and immediately reports the information to the 
compliance director, the coach still has information about a potential vi-
olation.  If an investigation concludes with no findings against the head 
coach and no penalties imposed on the team, there may be questions 
about the sufficiency and objectivity of that investigation and suspicions 
that the head coach doctored records or coached witnesses as to what to 
say.  If, on the other hand, the coach conducts an inquiry, however lim-
ited, more substantial problems arise. 
Coaches are problem-solvers; they care about their programs, 
worry about competition consequences, and seek to protect their student-
athletes.  They are not trained investigators.  Nonetheless, coaches who 
ask questions have involved themselves in an investigation.  Even a few 
questions may alert others or permit them time to consider what and how 
to answer when the compliance director comes to call.  In consequence, 
then, even a few questions may both corrupt an investigation and trigger 
questions about a coach’s motives.  A final problem with alerting the 
head coach is that the coach may be complicit in the violations or will 
actively engage in efforts to subvert an investigation.79  As a result, per-
sons who alert a coach have put a bullseye on their foreheads.  They risk 
being fired, and also may be the subject of COI findings and penalties. 
 
 78. Reporting to a sports supervisor rather than the compliance director raises some of 
the same issues discussed in text about head coaches. The focus is on head coaches because 
they are the most likely staff members to whom reports of suspected violations will be made. 
They also are the ones most likely to have their motives questioned and to have the most 
invested in subverting an investigation to protect their programs. As one example, consider 
Penn State. The assistant coach who witnessed Sandusky’s sexual behavior with a juvenile 
reported to Head Coach Joe Paterno, and not to the compliance director or the police. See Sara 
Ganim, Mike McQueary told Joe Paterno he saw something ‘extremely sexual’ between Jerry 
Sandusky, young boy, PATRIOT NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.pennlive.com/mid-
state/2011/12/mcqueary_says_he_sat_at_patern.html. 
 79. See New, supra note 62. 
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C. Failure to Maintain Confidentiality in Investigations 
Keeping an investigation confidential and limiting those in the 
know is the best way to assure the integrity of an investigation and to 
insulate later findings from skepticism and criticism.  In any organiza-
tion, and certainly an athletics department, keeping an investigation fully 
confidential is difficult to achieve. 
One reason is that people talk, no matter the admonition to keep 
information confidential.  Another reason is that there are people who in 
the normal course of things need to know.  If there are issues related to 
student-athlete well-being, then the team physician or trainers may need 
to be informed.  An athletic director is the chief executive officer of the 
athletic department and needs to know matters of significance that go on 
in the department.  With such knowledge, the athletic director may make 
different decisions regarding job assignments that may arise.  The 
knowledge also may give the athletic director helpful context for under-
standing staff interactions.  The athletic director typically is the compli-
ance director’s reporting line, and the compliance director would find it 
difficult to withhold information from the athletic director.  In turn, an 
athletic director will want to alert the head coach whose program is im-
plicated. 
There are very good reasons why the athletic director wants to in-
form the head coach.  First, this is simply good management.  An athletic 
director needs a good working relationship with senior staff members.  
Second, a head coach needs to have sufficient information to run the 
team.  For example, if a student-athlete’s eligibility is at risk, the head 
coach may need to prepare other student-athletes to play or may need a 
new recruiting strategy.  Third, head coaches, particularly those with 
winning records on popular teams, can generate fan and media support 
and also may have connections to powerful donors and perhaps even 
university trustees.80  An athletic director can ill afford to have these oth-
ers believe the coach has been mistreated.  Finally, the head coach may 
learn through other channels about an investigation and believe the fail-
ure to inform betrays an affirmative mistrust of him rather than investi-
gative prudence.  This portends ill for the relationship between athletic 
director and head coach post investigation. 
 
 80. In 2011, the Ohio State football team was investigated for NCAA violations. Gordon 
Gee, the Ohio State president at the time, was asked if he was considering firing the then head 
coach, Jim Tressel. Tressel’s Ohio State teams won multiple Big Ten Conference champion-
ships and a national championship. In response to the question, Gee joked, “No, are you kid-
ding? Let me just be very clear: I’m just hopeful the coach doesn’t dismiss me.” Jim Tressel 
tenders resignation, ESPN (May 30, 2011), https://www.espn.com/college-foot-
ball/news/story?id=6606999. The joke had more than a gem of truth to it. 
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In most cases, the risk in alerting a head coach may be offset by the 
reasons for alerting the coach.  When, however, there is reason to believe 
that a head coach is complicit in the commission of violations, or there 
is reason to believe a head coach will attempt to subvert an investigation, 
the calculus changes.  In that situation, the compliance director must ad-
vise the athletic director of the inadvisability of alerting the coach.  A 
reporting line outside athletics can assist the compliance director.81  An 
outside person can reinforce the need to segregate information from a 
head coach and also will have authority, or access to authority, to require 
that an athletic director refrain from giving the head coach a heads up.82 
D. Michigan State as Object Lesson 
An object lesson of the consequences of failing to report is the sex 
abuse of student-athletes at Michigan State University.  Larry Nassar 
was a physician on the staff of the Michigan State University College of 
Medical Osteopathy and the trainer for the Michigan State women’s 
gymnastics team.83  In February 2018, he was sentenced to forty to 175 
years in prison for sexual assaults and misconduct perpetrated on more 
than 330 victims under the guise of medical treatment.84 
Beginning in 1997 with the first report, and continuing until 2016, 
when Nassar’s conduct became public, at least eight student-athletes 
shared concerns about Nassar to staff members at Michigan State.85  Not 
one of the student-athletes shared their concerns with the compliance 
 
 81. See What is the NCAA’s phone number?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/what-
ncaas-phone-number (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). 
 82. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
 83. Jen Kirby, The sex abuse scandal surrounding USA Gymnastics team doctor Larry 
Nassar, explained, VOX (May 16, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.vox.com/identi-
ties/2018/1/19/16897722/sexual-abuse-usa-gymnastics-larry-nassar-explained. Nassar also 
had been a former trainer for USA Gymnastics, the governing body for Olympics Gymnastics 
Competition; and a six-time winner of the Elite Gymnastic Coaches “National Contributor of 
the Year” award. Tim Evans et al., How Larry Nassar abused hundreds of gymnasts and 
eluded justice for decades, USA TODAY NETWORK (Apr. 4, 2018, 4:59 PM), https://www.usa-
breakingnews.net/2018/01/how-larry-nassar-abused-hundreds-of-gymnasts-and-eluded-jus-
tice-for-decades/. 
 84. Meghan Keneally, MSU agrees to pay gymnastics doctor Larry Nassar’s accusers 
$500 million in settlement, ABC NEWS (May 16, 2018, 9:58 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/msu-agrees-pay-gymnastics-doctor-larry-nassars-
accusers/story?id=55208344. 
 85. James Dator, A comprehensive timeline of the Larry Nassar case, SBNATION (July 
31, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/2018/1/19/16900674/larry-nassar-abuse-
timeline-usa-gymnastics-michigan-state; Kim Kozlowski, What MSU knew: 14 were warned 
of Nassar abuse, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.detroit-
news.com/story/tech/2018/01/18/msu-president-told-nassar-complaint-2014/1042071001/; 
Sarah Brown, How a Transformational President Set Michigan Stateon a Course to Disaster, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 8, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-a-Trans-
formational/243369. 
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director; not one of the staff members to whom they reported took their 
concerns to the compliance director (or any other athletic department or 
campus senior administrator).86 
In 2014, a student-athlete brought a formal Title IX complaint 
against Nassar.87  The Title IX investigator confined her investigation to 
the four squares of the complaint.88  Had she known about the earlier 
information, she might have expanded the scope of her inquiry to include 
interviews with the other student-athletes and the staff members to 
whom they shared concerns.  Later, when the full scope of Nassar’s con-
duct became public, the university found no shelter in the fact that none 
of the earlier student-athlete concerns had been reported to the compli-
ance director in real time.89 
The consequences to Michigan State include $500 million paid in 
settlements to resolve civil litigation complaints filed by Nassar’s vic-
tims,90 a Title IX investigation into systemic failures in Michigan’s 
State’s handling of Nassar information,91 a Clery Act investigation92 that 
resulted in $4.5 million in fines,93 a two-year attorney general 
 
 86. Kozlowski, supra note 85. 
 87. Caroline Kitchener, The Nassar Investigation That Never Made Headlines, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/01/the-nas-
sar-investigation-that-never-made-headlines/551717/. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A Record Fine for Underreporting Sex Crimes, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/06/education-depart-
ment-fines-michigan-state-45-million-not-reporting-nassar-crimes. 
 90. Mitch Smith & Anemona Hartocollis, Michigan State’s $500 Million for Nassar Vic-
tims Dwarfs Other Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/05/16/us/larry-nassar-michigan-state-settlement.html; Will Hobson & Cindy 
Boren, Michigan State settles with Larry Nassar victims for $500 million, WASH. POST (May 
16, 2018, 10:48 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2018/05/16/michigan-state-settles-larry-nassar-lawsuits-for-500-million/?noredi-
rect=on&utm_term=.961774416a48&wpisrc=al_news__alert-sports—alert-na-
tional&wpmk=1 (reporting that award provides $425 million to 332 Nassar victims, an aver-
age of $1.28 million per victim and $75 million in a trust to cover other victims who may 
come forward, less lawyer fees of one-third); A.J. Perez, How much money will Larry Nassar 
survivors get? Grim process will determine settlements, USA TODAY (May 16, 2018, 5:59 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/05/16/larry-nassar-survivors-sexual-
abuse-settlements-money/617333002/. 
 91. Eric Kelderman, After the Nassar Conviction, Michigan State Goes on Trial, CHRON. 
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/after-nassar-conviction-
michigan-state-goes-on-trial/; David Jesse, Feds sending more investigators to MSU’s cam-
pus, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 26, 2018, 4:12 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/lo-
cal/michigan/2018/02/26/feds-sending-more-investigators-msu-campus/373884002/. 
 92. Kelderman, supra note 91; Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and 
Campus Crime Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2020). 
 93. Tawnell D. Hobbs, Melissa Korn & Louise Radnofsky, Michigan State University 
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investigation, and several other investigations.94  There also has been 
untold damage to Michigan State’s reputation, and likely no good way 
to assess the magnitude of that damage. 
The case also has had substantial impact on individuals.  The Mich-
igan State athletic director resigned.95  The Michigan State president re-
signed and is being prosecuted.96  The dean of the Michigan State Col-
lege of Osteopathic Medicine retired,97 foregoing emeritus status and 
benefits paid to retired senior administrators.98  He since has been con-
victed of two misdemeanors and sentenced to one year in jail.99  The 
University General Counsel, who handled an internal investigation, re-
signed.100  The head Women’s Gymnastics Coach resigned and since has 
been convicted of lying to the police about what gymnasts told her about 
Nassar.101  A doctor who consulted in the Title IX investigation resigned 
in advance of being fired.102 
 
 94. David Eggert, AG suspends investigation of Michigan State over Nassar, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 24, 2019), https://ap-
news.com/bb09d1bae41c718ba2b9621c6bb6dea5. 
 95. Dan Murphy, Michigan State AD Mark Hollis resigns, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/22223678/michigan-state-athletic-director-
mark-hollis-resigns. 
 96. Tracy Connor, Michigan State president Lou Anna Simon resigns over Nassar scan-
dal, NBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2018, 3:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michi-
gan-state-president-lou-anna-simon-resigns-over-nassar-scandal-n840866. Simon is one of 
fewer than twelve Michigan State faculty to hold a Hannah Professorship, expected to be 
awarded only to star scholars; Sarah Brown, Michigan State’s Ex-President Now Holds a 
Prestigious Professorship. Some of Her Colleagues Aren’t Happy About It, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Michigan-State-s/242644. 
 97. Sarah Brown, Here’s a List of Who Has Left Michigan State Since the Nassar Scan-
dal Erupted, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/arti-
cle/Here-s-a-List-of-Who-Has/243145. 
 98. Kim Kozlowski, Strampel retires ahead of possible firing by MSU, DETROIT NEWS 
(July 6, 2018, 11:24 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michi-
gan/2018/07/06/strampel-retires-ahead-possible-firing-msu/762808002/. 
 99. Megan Banta, Former MSU dean William Strampel sentenced to one year in jail, 
LANSING ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/lo-
cal/2019/08/07/former-msu-dean-william-strampel-sentenced-larry-nassar-michigan-
state/1933906001/. 
 100. Matt Harmon, VP of Legal Affairs at MSU resigns in the wake of more Nassar-re-
lated lawsuits, MICH. DAILY (Feb. 20, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.michigandaily.com/sec-
tion/administration/msu-vp-legal-affairs-retires-after-new-lawsuits-filed-against-university. 
 101. Megan Banta, Former Michigan State University gymnastics coach Kathie Klages 
convicted of lying to police, LANSING ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.lan-
singstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2020/02/14/former-msu-gymnastics-coach-kathie-
klages-convicted-lying-police/4761128002/. 
 102. Mat Mencarini, MSU doctor resigned after removing Nassar patient files, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Mar. 18, 2017, 10:01 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michi-
gan/2017/03/17/larry-nassar-brooke-lemmen-gymnastics/99338982/. 
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V. ELEMENTS OF AN INVESTIGATION 
Investigations begin when the compliance director learns of poten-
tial violations.  Should the compliance director decide the violations, if 
proved, are Level I or Level II, the compliance director should inform 
the NCAA enforcement staff.  That shows an intent to cooperate.  In 
addition, in these days of social media and a twenty-four/seven news 
cycle, the enforcement staff may hear something from another source.  It 
always is better for institutional compliance staff to get there first. 
A. External or Internal? 
Once a compliance director decides that Level I or II violations may 
have been committed, university senior administrators have a choice to 
make: hire external investigators to lead the investigation103 or proceed 
with athletics compliance staff.104  Although there are benefits and draw-
backs to either choice, common to both is that investigators must know 
the elements of NCAA violations sufficiently well so that they may de-
tect additional areas of potential violations; they must be skeptical about 
information provided; they must resist accepting explanations at face 
value; and they must be intrepid in pursuing uncomfortable areas of in-
quiry or challenging popular and forceful coaches. 
Good investigations require time, diligence, testing and confirming 
information, and  proceeding in ways designed to be impervious to tam-
pering.105  External investigators investigate for a living, are more expe-
rienced, and likely are better skilled in interviewing techniques.  They 
also will not be hampered by prior relationships with investigation tar-
gets and other witnesses and will not worry whether their skepticism and 
probing will produce hurt feelings in co-workers or affect work relation-
ships once an investigation ends.  Outside investigators also are more 
likely to hear corroborative tangential information that a staff member 
would not want a co-worker to know.  Consider a staff member having 
an extramarital affair who was at a hotel when he saw a booster pay a 
student-athlete.  Why he was at the hotel may be information he is more 
inclined to share with a stranger. 
 
 103. An investigation may be external to the athletic department, but internal to the uni-
versity. At Nebraska, the FAR has the authority to remove an investigation outside the athletic 
department when the FAR believes an external review is needed. See Memorandum from 
UNL Chancellor, supra note 20. The FAR chairs are the review committee. 
 104. See id. 
 105. NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 176 (2000) (Univer-
sity of Minnesota). The University learned of a possible major infraction perpetuated by the 
Head Basketball Coach. It alerted the head coach that team members would be interviewed. 
Before interviews could be conducted, the head coach met with the team and coached them 
to lie. Id. 
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External investigators are more likely to satisfy outside observers 
that an investigation was complete and impartial.  They also may make 
it easier for university and athletic administrators internally to imple-
ment recommended prophylactic measures.  Finally, outside investiga-
tors will free compliance staff to continue to do all the other jobs that 
need to be done. 
On the flip side, compliance staff will be more familiar with athletic 
department, university, and Conference policies and may well be more 
familiar with the ins and outs of NCAA bylaws.  They not only more 
quickly can locate documents, but they are better positioned to know 
what documents might exist and which staff members and boosters 
might have relevant information.  They also know the proclivities, 
quirks, and behaviors of coaches and staff.  Institutional compliance di-
rectors may cause fewer disruptions to work and student-athlete sched-
ules as, by contrast to outside investigators, they need not fit all activity 
within a tightened time frame but, instead, can schedule interviews 
around work and student-athlete schedules.  And, finally, institutional 
compliance staff will be much less expensive than an outside investiga-
tor.106 
B. Interviewing Fundamentals 
No matter whether conducted by external or internal investigators, 
or by both working in tandem, some components of conducting an in-
vestigation are common to all investigations.  First, it is critically im-
portant to act promptly to assure that relevant documents are not lost, 
removed, or destroyed.107  Second, interviews should be kept confiden-
tial;108 one of the best ways to corrupt an investigation is for information 
to become known to investigation targets.  Third, there always should be 
two people conducting interviews.  Fourth, interviews should be rec-
orded.109 
An investigator needs to decide who should be interviewed, the or-
der in which interviews are conducted, the questions to be asked of 
 
 106. Anne Ryman, University of Arizona spends $1.4M on legal bills related to FBI bas-
ketball investigation, AZCENTRAL (Nov. 29, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.azcen-
tral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2018/11/29/arizona-wildcats-legal-bills-
ncaa-basketball-investigation/2120399002/. 
 107. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.5.9 (Access to Information); for guidance 
on document preservation, see infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 108. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 § 19.5.8. 
 109. There are myriad police manuals and books on the subject. See generally, e.g., JOHN 
HESS, INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 2015); JOHN R. 
SCHAFER & JOE NAVARRO, ADVANCED INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES (3d ed. 2016); DARREN 
DRAKE, THE INFORMATION YOU WANT (2016); see also DAVID E. ZULAWSKI ET AL., 
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 420 (2d ed. 2001). 
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witnesses, and the order of questions.  Typically, interviewers first talk 
to witnesses predicted to have the most critical information because what 
is learned may frame later interviews.  An important early decision is 
when to interview the investigation target.  Although witnesses will be 
told to keep the interview confidential, they nonetheless may fail to fol-
low that admonition.  Where to slot the target depends on what inter-
viewers think is the greater risk to the integrity of the investigation. 
The goal in an interview is to acquire all relevant information, of 
course.  To achieve that goal, interviewing is an interactive process be-
tween asking the right, and right type of, questions and being an active 
listener.  An active listener hears and pursues inconsistencies and iden-
tifies relevant documents and corroborating (or refuting) information not 
before identified.  An active listener also pays attention to what is NOT 
said. 
Specific questions produce specific answers that can be matched 
against other information and, therefore, identify witnesses who dissem-
ble, but they also may alert targets as to where the pitfalls are in their 
answers and, in consequence, alert targets how to tailor a response.  In 
focusing their attention in a particular direction, specific questions may 
lead even a fully cooperative witness to fail to provide other relevant 
information.110 
Open-ended questions, with uninterrupted time for witnesses to an-
swer, avoid the pitfalls of specific questions.  They also minimize later 
claims that the witness’s information was tainted by what the interviewer 
shared.111  A negative is that open-ended questions extend the time that 
interviews take.  Their major downside is that they risk even active lis-
teners missing important new information or being distracted by answers 
into the pathways the answers provide, thereby failing to go back over 
the interview and follow up to acquire additional specific information. 
The uncertainty that impedes people from making reports also leads 
them to equivocate or understate when they come forward.  An investi-
gator must avoid concluding that a tepid or equivocal answer means 
there is little or nothing to follow up. 
A particularly bad mistake is for an investigator to decide that there 
can be no case proved in a swearing contest.  The scenario:  one person 
reports that something happened; the other denies it.  That should begin 
 
 110. See, e.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 193 at 26 
(2002) (getting specific too early may permit a subject to answer a particular question honestly 
but avoid answering the sense and true intent of the question). 
 111. See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 18-19 (2011) (discussing criminal law literature regarding con-
taminations of confessions by providing information to a suspect). 
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an investigation, not end it.  Investigators should seek corroborating ev-
idence for each version and evaluate the comparative internal consisten-
cies of the two versions and the surrounding contextual information.  Not 
all situations generate equally plausible sets of inferences about what 
occurred.  In addition, people and information are not equally credible.112 
At the end of the day, even if there are just the two versions and not 
much more, an investigative conclusion can be made.  Consider the mu-
nicipal judge who affirms a traffic ticket when the entire basis of the 
evidence is the report of the police officer, contradicted by the driver. 
C. The Backend Forward Approach 
Every investigation worth the name must be conducted inde-
pendently, fully, and fairly.113  Every investigation also must generate 
confidence in others that it was conducted independently, fully, and 
fairly.  While these two goals appear consonant one to the other, they 
may point to different conduct during an investigation.114  The point here 
is a simple one: the scope and direction of an investigation at the front 
end should be guided by how one would like to handle questions and 
criticism at the back end of an investigation—at a COI hearing or from 
the media, an academic senate, the state legislature, or various interest 
groups. 
Suppose it is alleged that Head Coach Touchdown paid two recruits 
to attend State University, and that the university lacked institutional 
control because it had no effective system in place to police against the 
possibility of such conduct taking place.  Coach Touchdown is a highly 
successful football coach.  His teams have won Conference champion-
ships and one national title.  The recruits were both five-star players out 
of high school, and they were integral to the 2019 national championship 
State University won.  If the violations are proved, Head Coach Touch-
down no doubt will lose his job, the two student-athletes will be 
 
 112. Among other things, an investigator can assess the credibility of each individual with 
respect to past history and reputation for truthfulness; assess the credibility in terms of the 
common sense of what is being reported; assess the credibility in terms of other information 
in the record; and assess the credibility in terms of reason, if any, for dissembling. 
 113. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Why companies like Wells Fargo ignore their whistleblow-
ers – at their peril, CONVERSATION (Oct. 24, 2016, 12:09 AM), http://Theconversa-
tion.Com/Why-Companies-Like-Wells-Fargo-Ignore-Their-Whistleblowers -At-Their-Peril-
67501. Surprisingly, perhaps, that is not always what occurs. 
 114. See, e.g., Geri Ann S. Baptista, Managing reputational risk: Why lawyers and PR 
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ineligible to compete, the national championship will be vacated, and 
there will be team scholarship limits going forward.115 
An institutional investigation ensues.  One conclusion of the inves-
tigators is that Head Coach Touchdown made the payments.  A second 
conclusion is that the university both adequately monitored the football 
program and exercised institutional control.  To reach the second con-
clusion, the investigators decided that Touchdown acted without the 
knowledge or connivance of any other person in the athletic department 
and that he cleverly circumvented athletic department policies reasona-
bly calculated to detect violations.  It is predictable that Touchdown will 
publicly criticize these conclusions and claim that the university aban-
doned his interests to protect its own.  Fans, donors, and media repre-
sentatives also may challenge the merits and motives of the university’s 
position. 
The university at the backend will want to demonstrate that it pro-
vided procedural fairness to Coach Touchdown during the investigation.  
One thing investigators should attempt to do at the front end is to accede 
to all Coach Touchdown’s requests for documents and for witnesses that 
the university should interview, even if the requests are time consuming 
and even if the investigators believe the requests are designed to delay 
the conclusion of the investigation.  The investigators also should docu-
ment all coach requests and their responses to them.  If the investigators 
refuse a request, for fear it will jeopardize the investigation, or because 
they believe the coach has been deliberately and repetitively attempting 
to thwart or stall the investigation, then the investigators should create a 
full record demonstrating why the request was denied. 
D. Follow-up, Especially When Investigation Ends with No Finding of 
Culpability 
It falls to compliance staff to assure that there is adequate follow-
up post investigation even, and perhaps especially, if there are no find-
ings of violations.  Return to Michigan State and the 2014 Title IX com-
plaint filed against Larry Nassar.  After a four-month investigation, Kris-
tine Moore, the Michigan State Assistant Director for Institutional 
Equity, found insufficient evidence that Title IX was violated.116  At the 
same time, she accepted as true much of what the student-athlete said 
about how Nassar performed the procedure, and she recommended 
 
 115. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 19.9.5 (discussing core penalties for Level I and 
Level II violations). 
 116. Jean Casarez et al., She filed a complaint against Larry Nassar in 2014. Nothing 
happened, CNN (Feb. 1, 2018, 5:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/01/us/msu-amanda-
thomashow-complaint-larry-nassar/index.html. 
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prophylactic measures to cabin potential liability arising out of the pro-
cedure and to make the procedure more patient-sensitive.117  Her recom-
mendations were not implemented. 118 
William Strampel, the dean of the College of Medical Osteopathy 
who was Nassar’s supervisor outside athletics, also made post-Report 
recommendations.119  He  did not take  steps to assure Nassar com-
plied.120 
The failure to follow up post-investigation when there is no finding 
of culpability at best confounds a finding of failure of proof with a find-
ing that the violations did not occur.  Such a failure of follow-up would 
be a significant element, perhaps even determinative, in a showing of 
lack of institutional control should a later infractions case develop. 
VI. WHAT TO INCLUDE IN A COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN121 
Effective risk management requires advance planning.  This section 
describes some of the most critical elements in a plan. 
 
 117. Moore advised that Nassar’s treatment should be carefully explained, that there be 
explicit patient consent, that a third person be present during the treatments, and that Nassar 
offer patients a choice between skin-on-skin and over the clothes manipulation of breast or 
pelvic floor area, unless skin on skin was medically necessary. She also recommended that 
Michigan State consider providing an information sheet to a patient in advance of treatment 
and include a disclaimer. Matt Mencarini, MSU hid full conclusions of 2014 Nassar report 
from victim, LANSING ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 4:23 PM), https://www.lansingstatejour-
nal.com/story/news/local/2018/01/26/michigan-state-larry-nassar-title-ix/1069493001. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Megan Banta, William Strampel first Michigan State official tied to Larry Nassar to 
be convicted, USA TODAY (June 12, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/education/2019/06/12/william-strampel-michigan-state-university-msu-
sexual-assault-jury/1433882001/ (stating that Strampel told Nassar to wear gloves and have 
someone else present); Julie Mack, MSU colleagues initially defended Nassar, according to 
police investigation, MICH. LIVE (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.mlive.com/news/2018/04/msu_colleagues_initially_defen.html. 
 120. The Associated Press, Michigan State dean charged, accused of harassing students, 
OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Mar. 27, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.uti-
caod.com/news/20180327/michigan-state-dean-charged-accused-of-harassing-students. 
 121. Several years ago, the athletic directors in the NCAA Division I FBS (formerly called 
D-IA) worked on a plan for athletic department compliance. The plan was never adopted. Its 
components cover the subjects discussed in this article. See D-IA Athletics Directors Ass’n 
Compliance and Enforcement Task Force, Standards for Effective Compliance and Risk Man-
agement Programs Maintaining Institutional Control, (June 5, 2013) (on file with author). A 
complete risk management plan also will include protocols for how to handle media and other 
external constituencies during the period of an investigation and post-investigation. This com-
ponent will be the responsibility of university and athletic department high administrators and 
involves interaction with legal counsel and media relations experts. It therefore is outside the 
scope of this article. 
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A. The Staff Reporting Obligation 
Because the prime impediment to prompt discovery and handling 
of violations is that individuals with information about violations do not 
report, a prime focus in a risk management plan is to enhance the likeli-
hood that coaches and staff will report.  Protocols should include: 
1. Periodic education of all staff so that they understand their behav-
ioral and reporting responsibilities regarding operative legal, cam-
pus, NCAA, Conference, and Athletic Department rules and poli-
cies.  These education sessions should include: 
a. Regular compliance unit meetings with compliance staff 
and academic eligibility certifying staff members within the 
athletic department and on the greater campus. 
b. Specific education for coaches and staff on NCAA, Confer-
ence, and Athletic Department rules and policies as they di-
rectly affect them. 
c. A clear statement that the first priority of staff is to the uni-
versity and athletic department, not particular coaches, staff, 
or student-athletes. 
2. Regular training and written directives in the athletic department 
compliance manual that cover the obligation to report suspected vi-
olations, including: 
a. A clear statement that suspected NCAA violations need to 
be reported to the compliance director, and only the compli-
ance director. 
b. A clear statement that a report to anyone other than the com-
pliance director, including the head coach of a sport, does 
not satisfy a reporting obligation. 
c. A clear statement that a failure to report triggers employ-
ment consequences that may include termination. 
d. A clear statement that a staff member or coach who suspects 
a violation was committed should not investigate before re-
porting, even to ask a few questions. 
e. A clear statement that a report must be made even if the vi-
olation was thwarted before its completion or action was 
taken to remedy the violation. 
f. A clear statement that a report must be made even if the con-
duct does not relate to the staff member’s athletic unit. 
g. A clear statement that a report must be made when a staff 
member has a reasonable suspicion that a violation was 
committed.  When in doubt, ask.  When in doubt, report. 
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B. Compliance Staff Treatment of Reports 
Compliance staff must make judgments regarding the extent to 
which follow up is required based on information reported or otherwise 
acquired.  Some grounds rules include: 
1. Compliance staff must regularly check traditional, non-traditional, 
and social media for information about student-athletes and coaches.  
NCAA enforcement staff do so, and compliance staff should be fore-
armed.122 
2. Compliance staff should not discount information because of its 
source, or because the individual reporting seems to be uncertain, or 
to equivocate. 
3. All reports of potential violations are not equal.  The obligation to 
conduct a full investigation increases when: 
a. The person reporting is someone the compliance staff per-
ceives to be trustworthy.  This does not mean that infor-
mation from a less reliable source should be ignored.  It 
simply reflects a commonplace that the more reliable the 
source is perceived to be, the more seriously the compliance 
staff should treat the information. 
b. The suspected violation concerns a high-profile program (or 
coach or student-athlete), or the matter potentially will have 
an impact on student-athlete eligibility.  The likelihood of 
media and other public scrutiny increases in these cases and, 
therefore, so too, the need for a full investigation. 
c.  The suspected violation is Level I or Level II.  The need for 
a full investigation is increased even when the information 
reported is relatively unspecific. 
d. The information provided is detailed. 
e. The person who reports has first-hand knowledge of the sus-
pected violation (as compared to reporting hearsay). 
f. The person who reports describes more than one instance of 
suspected violations. 
g. More than one person reports the same potential violation. 
h. More than one person reports different potential violations 
committed by the same coach or in the same sport. 
 
 122. See, e.g., Andy Staples, Cheating for Dummies: Your guide to smarter NCAA rule-
breaking, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 5, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writ-
ers/andy_staples/07/05/cheating-for-dummies/index.html. 
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C. Minimal Requisites for Conducting an Investigation 
Investigations require thought and planning in advance.  Protocols 
setting minimum standards assure that certain requisites always will be 
followed and that there will be consistency across investigations. 
1. Get to the documents as soon as possible. 
2. Speak to IT regarding retrieval of deleted work computer files and 
the extent to which there is evidence of phone and text messages and 
whether they may be retrieved.  If a staff member or coach is an 
investigative target, then consider seizing the computer. 
3. Seize phone records and emails on university accounts. 
4. Request all phone numbers and emails.  Dates and times and recipi-
ents of phone and email and text messages, as well as exchanges 
between recipients and others, can tell a tale independent of the con-
tent of the messages.123 
5. Ask about personal phone records—other cell phones owned by 
staff, cell phones of family members.  Search for other social media 
information. 
6. Plan the sequence of interviews and questions before beginning in-
terviews.  Cast a wide net to see who might have information.  Often 
there are pockets of information in various hands.  Do not forget 
secretaries, equipment managers, trainers, custodians, and other 
non-administrative staff members.  They often are best positioned to 
hear information. 
7. Have two people at every interview that may be significant; if pos-
sible, have two people at every interview.  Ideally, the second person 
should be someone outside athletics. 
8. Tape record interviews.  Remember that the interview is being rec-
orded and later may be heard by others, including NCAA enforce-
ment staff.  Do not turn the tape on and off.  It raises questions as to 
what might have been said when the tape was off.  If the interviewee 
refuses to be taped, tape the refusal.  But now it is imperative to have 
an outside person be one of the two people who conduct the inter-
view. 
9. Interview witnesses separately.  Group sessions corrupt the infor-
mation that any one individual may provide.124  They also may lead 
 
 123. See, e.g., INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 193, supra note 110; see also NCAA DIV. I COMM. 
ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REP. NO. 323 at 11-13, 23-27 (2010) (University of Southern 
California). 
 124. There is considerable research on eyewitness identification, and how one witness can 
influence another. See generally, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identifica-
tion: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 
765 (1995); Howard Eisenberg & Bruce Feustal, Criminal Law: Pretrial Identification: An 
Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria, 58 MARQ. L. Rev. 659, 673 (1975). 
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more reticent individuals, and those with embarrassing information, 
to remain silent. 
10. Be skeptical.  People lie.  People have faulty memories. 
11. Do not assume that records and forms always tell an accurate tale.  
People sometimes keep bad records.  People sometimes lie in rec-
ords. 
12. Create a record as the investigation proceeds that summarizes what 
is occurring, including memos to the file explaining investigative 
decisions made, why, and who was consulted. 
13. Be prepared to conduct second and even third interviews as new 
matters are uncovered. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Dean Smith,125 the longtime head coach of the North Carolina Uni-
versity men’s basketball team, said of intercollegiate athletics that, 
“[a]thletics is to the university like the front porch is to a home.  It is the 
most visible part, yet certainly not the most important.” 126 
No doubt high-profile teams and head coaches sit on the front porch 
and affect a university’s reputation.  No doubt losses by a football team, 
particularly in a major football program, can rock the porch, dominate 
public and media discussion, affect donor contributions, and even in-
volve public officials in a discussion about what to do.  Equally no doubt, 
NCAA violations and student-athlete behavioral issues can rock the 
front porch and cause long-term injury to the academic reputation and 
status of a university. 
Universities have an absolute obligation as NCAA members to 
maintain control of their athletic programs.  Institutional compliance di-
rectors are the athletic administrators with first-line responsibility to see 
that this happens.  They are responsible for NCAA rules education, com-
pliance form creation and management, rules interpretation, waivers, in-
vestigations, and reporting potential NCAA violations.127  They also act 
as liaisons to campus processes that include Title IX investigations and 
student discipline, and they are the point persons for student wellbeing 
and behavioral issues.128  Many of these “hot button” matters bring pub-
lic scrutiny and criticism.  No doubt, then, institutional compliance di-
rectors also sit on the front porch. 
 
 125. Michael Levy, Dean Smith, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biog-
raphy/Dean-Smith (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 126. Maximize Marketing in College Athletics, FRONT PORCH ATHLETICS, 
https://www.frontporchathletics.com/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).. 
 127. See supra Part II. 
 128. See supra Part II. 
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This article described the nuts and bolts of the institutional compli-
ance job.  It then focused on a prime factor for problems on the institu-
tional control part of the front porch—the failure of those with infor-
mation about violations to report that information to the compliance 
director—and explained why individuals fail to report.  Finally, it of-
fered guidance on how to keep the front porch sturdy.  In other words, it 
offered guidance on how to increase the likelihood of reports being 
made, as well as guidance on the minimal requisites of a violation inves-
tigation, and the prime elements of a compliance risk management plan. 
The front porch is visible, yes.  With visibility comes scrutiny and 
the potential for considerable, and protracted, second-guessing and crit-
icism for how universities oversee their front porch.129  Universities have 
every incentive to avoid being overwhelmed by the front porch.  What 
compliance directors do, and how they do it, can either enhance the 
chances for a well-built and sturdy front porch.  Or not. 
 
 129. See, e.g., Ted Mitchell, Higher education must clean out its ‘front porch’, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 25, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2018/04/25/higher-education-must-clean-out-its-front-porch/; see generally, e.g., 
Frank G. Splitt, Time for accountability in sports, The NAT’L CATHOLIC REP., Nov. 14, 2008; 
JOHN S. & JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUNDATION, COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, 
A CALL TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (2001); 
MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS HAS CRIPPLED  
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION (2001); RICK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE 
CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT (1996); 
COALITION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPREHENSIVE 
ATHLETICS REFORM (2003); WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., RECLAIMING THE GAME: COLLEGE 
SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2003); JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE 
(2000); JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS 
AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2002); JOHN R. THELIN, GAMES COLLEGES PLAY: SCANDAL 
AND REFORM IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (1994). 
